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Much of the recent economic debate about the impact of stimulus packages has focused on the size
of the crucial government purchases multiplier.  But equally crucial is the size of the government purchases
multiplicand—the change in government purchases of goods and services that the multiplier actually
multiplies.  Using new data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and considering developments
at both the federal and the state and local level, we find that the government purchases multiplicand
through the 2nd quarter of 2010 has been only 2 percent of the $862 billion American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. This increase in government purchases has occurred mainly at
the federal level.  While states and localities received substantial grants under ARRA, state and local
governments have not increased their purchases of goods and services. Instead they reduced borrowing
and increased transfer payments. These findings explain why, regardless of the size of a government
purchases multiplier, changes in government purchases have had no material effect on the growth
of GDP since the time ARRA was enacted. The implication is not that ARRA has been too small,
but rather that it failed to increase government consumption expenditures and infrastructure spending
as many had predicted from such a large package. A consideration of the counterfactual event that
there had not been an ARRA supports the hypothesis that state and local government borrowing would
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The debate about the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) has 
been accompanied by a surge of research on the size of the government purchases multiplier.  In 
January 2009, Romer and Bernsten (2009) released a paper showing that the multiplier was large 
and that the stimulus package would have a large effect.  Then, in February, Cogan, Cwik, 
Taylor, and Wieland (2009) responded with a paper arguing that the models used by Romer and 
Bernstein (2009) were not representative of modern research, and that if one used so-called new 
Keynesian rather than old Keynesian models, the multiplier was much smaller; they illustrated 
their results by evaluating ARRA with a representative modern model.
1    
  These papers were followed by a series of papers using new Keynesian models, including 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009), Eggertsson (2009), Erceg and Linde (2009), Hall 
(2009), and Drautzburg and Uhlig (2010).  While the multipliers differed somewhat among the 
new Keynesian models, Woodford (2010) showed they were quite similar once one controlled 
for timing differences.  In the meantime, old Keynesian models—with the larger multipliers—
continued to be used in policy debates, as exemplified in the paper by Blinder and Zandi (2010), 
and disputes over the impact of ARRA continued. 
Missing from this research is an empirical examination of what the government purchases 
multiplier has actually multiplied in the case of ARRA—that is, the change in government 
purchases due to ARRA.  The purpose of this paper is to examine this change in government 
purchases, both at the federal and at the state and local level. We use a new data series provided 
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis on the effects of ARRA on federal government purchases 
and on grants to state and local governments.   
                                                            
1 Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2009) focused on the Smets-Wouters (2009) model which has 
features similar to the Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) model and to other rational expectations 
models with sticky prices going back to Taylor (1993).   
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Because the ARRA grants to state and local government are fungible and not 
synchronized with purchases, determining the effect of ARRA on state and local government 
purchases is more difficult and uncertain than determining the effect on federal government 
purchases. We therefore analyze the state and local purchases data in detail.  We also consider 
counterfactuals, trace where the money went, and estimate time-series regressions of the 
relationship between ARRA grants and state and local government purchases.  Our main finding 
is that the increase in government purchases due to the ARRA has been remarkably small, 
especially when compared to the large size of the overall ARRA package.   In fact, the effect of 
ARRA on purchases appears to be so small that the size of the government purchases multiplier 
does not matter much compared to many other factors affecting the growth of GDP.   
 
1.  Definitions and Aggregate Data on Government Purchases 
  As Hall (2009) and others have emphasized the government purchases multiplier that has 
generated so much debate recently is the change in GDP associated with a change in government 
purchases. Government purchases are much different from government expenditures.  
Government purchases do not include transfer payments, subsidies, and interest payments, which 
are all part of government expenditures.  The best source of data on government purchases for 
macroeconomic purposes is the national income and product accounts (NIPA), which is reported 
quarterly.  Throughout this paper we use seasonally adjusted quarterly NIPA data stated at 
annual rates.   
Government purchases in the NIPA are divided into two major components: consumption 
expenditures and gross investment. Consumption expenditures consist of goods and services 
produced for public consumption such as law enforcement services, national defense, and 4 
 
elementary and secondary education.
2 Gross investment includes purchases of new structures, 
equipment and software.  The NIPA also breaks down government purchases into two sectors (1) 
federal and (2) state and local. The federal sector is further broken down into defense and non-
defense.  
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has been providing quarterly data on the effect 
of ARRA on federal government sector transactions in the NIPA.  The data are updated each 
month at the time of the advance estimates and updates of quarterly GDP in “Effect of the 
ARRA on Selected Federal Government Sector Transactions,” which is posted on the BEA 
website at http://www.bea.gov/recovery/index.htm?tabContainerMain=1. The latest data used in 
this paper go through the second quarter of 2010.   
The BEA data focus on the federal sector and thus give the amount of ARRA that is in 
the form of federal government purchases—both consumption and gross investment.  From these 
data it is therefore straightforward to determine the effect of ARRA on federal government 
purchases.   
It is more difficult, however, to determine the effect of ARRA on state and local 
government purchases.  The BEA reports the amount of ARRA that is in the form of current 
grants to state and local governments for Medicaid, education, and other items as well as capital 
grants to state and local governments for roads, bridges, and other public infrastructure projects.  
In the next section we present the results for federal government purchases and in the following 




2 Government consumption expenditures also include consumption of fixed capital, a partial measure of the value of 
the services from fixed government capital. 5 
 
2.  Effect of ARRA on Federal Government Purchases 
  The effect of ARRA on Federal government purchases has been very small through the 
second quarter of 2010. Of the total $862 billion in the ARRA stimulus package, the amount 
allocated to federal government purchases was $7.9 billion in 2009 and $10.1 in the first half of 
2010 according to the BEA. The portion allocated to infrastructure (gross investment) at the 
federal level was $0.9 billion in 2009 and $1.5 billion in the first two quarters of 2010.  Thus, of 
the total $862 billion, 0.3 percent has been spent on federal infrastructure projects.  
  Figures 1, 2, and 3 put these effects of ARRA in recent historical perspective. They show 
the ARRA effects compared with total federal government purchases from the year 2000 to the 
second quarter of 2010.  The figures show federal government purchases with and without the 
effect of ARRA. Figure 1 shows total government purchases and Figures 2 and 3 show 
consumption and gross investment respectively. The data are reported at annual rates and the 
ARRA effects are stated at annual rates.   
ARRA federal government purchases, federal government consumption, and federal 
gross investment as a share of their respective totals are shown in Table 1 for each quarter since 
ARRA was passed.  The impact of ARRA on federal purchases and each of its two components 
reaches one percent in the third quarter of 2009, one quarter after the recession officially ended.  
The biggest increase in the share also occurs in the third quarter of 2009 and then is relatively 
flat.  This pattern is also apparent in Figures 1, 2 and 3. 
Finally, Figure 4 shows the time path of federal government purchases and all other parts 
of ARRA as a share of GDP. By the second quarter of 2010 the overall ARRA package was a 
sizable 2.5 percent of GDP, but purchases were only 0.12 percent of GDP; the infrastructure part 6 
 
was only about 0.03 percent of GDP.  The small amounts could not be a material part of the 
changes in real GDP growth during the recent recovery, even if the multiplier were quite large.  
 
Table 1. Effect of ARRA on federal government purchases, federal government 














2009Q1  0.00 0.01 0.00 
2009Q2  0.12 0.13 0.07 
2009Q3  1.36 1.33 1.54 
2009Q4  1.25 1.35 0.63 
2010Q1  1.54 1.56 1.37 




3.  Effects of ARRA on State and Local Government Purchases    
A key feature of the ARRA is that it provides large transfers to state and local 
governments in the form of grants-in-aid.  For the purposes of assessing the impact of ARRA on 
GDP, it is important to distinguish between two types of grants.  First are those that state and 
local governments may directly use to finance purchases of goods and services.  Grants for 
transportation projects and elementary and secondary schools are included in this category. The 
second type is transfers that supplement household resources.  Federal Medicaid grants to states 
fall into this category.  Under NIPA accounting conventions, state Medicaid expenditures are 
treated as transfer payments to households which raise their disposable personal income.  Their 
impact on GDP depends on how much of the rise in income results in a rise in personal 
consumption expenditures.  In addition, to the extent that higher federal Medicaid grants are 7 
 
fungible at the state level they may free up other state revenues, and their impact may also be 
reflected by higher state government purchases of goods and services.  
 
 
Table 2 ARRA federal transfers (grants) to state and local governments  
(Billions of dollars at annual rates) 
 
                  Share       of        GDP 
 Total  Medicaid  Other  Total   Medicaid  Other 
2009Q1    49.4  48.9    0.5  0.35  0.35  0.00 
2009Q2      73.4  39.1 34.3 0.52 0.28 0.24 
2009Q3      90.3  38.4 51.9 0.64 0.27 0.37 
2009Q4  102.8  38.9 63.9 0.72 0.27 0.45 
2010Q1  106.1  40.7 65.4 0.73 0.28 0.45 
2010Q2  126.3  38.9 87.4 0.87 0.27 0.60 
 
 
Table 2 shows the amount of ARRA grants, expressed in annual rates and as a percentage 
of GDP.  Except for the first quarter of 2009, a majority of the grants are for areas other than 
Medicaid. The total grants to state and local governments quickly rise to 0.7 to 0.8 percent of 
GDP by the 3
rd quarter of 2009.  Although ARRA grants are small relative to GDP, they are 
potentially a source of stimulus in addition to federal purchases.     
ARRA grants are part of total receipts or aggregate income of the state and local 
government sector.  Figure 5 shows total receipts with and without the ARRA grants. As of the 
second quarter of 2010, these ARRA grants were equal to 7 percent of total state and local 
government income with Medicaid equal to 2 percent and other grants equal to 5 percent of total 





The Budget Constraint for State and Local Governments 
The question we wish to address is the effect of these grants on government purchases at 
the state and local level.  For this we must model how state and local governments respond to 
these grants.  The question is somewhat analogous to how the household sector responds to 
changes in transfer payments by adjusting consumption, where permanent income or life cycle 
models have proved useful and accurate. Like the household sector, state and local government 
officials recognize that the grants are temporary. And like the household sector, state and local 
governments can use federal grants for other purposes than purchases of goods and services.  
Depending on the timing and the degree to which ARRA grants are fungible, state and local 
governments could borrow less, save more, or increase expenditures on “non-purchase” items 
such as transfer payments to individuals.  And of course the incentives and constraints facing 
state and local governments may be more complex than households, which may make the 
permanent income theory less valid. 
The budget constraint for the state and local government sector helps frame the issues.  
The following variables
3 refer to the state and local sector in the aggregate: 
Gt = government purchases 
Et = total expenditures other than government purchases 
Lt = net lending or net borrowing (-) 
Rt = total receipts other than ARRA grants 
At = ARRA grants   
                                                            
3 Each variable has an exact counterpart in the NIPA accounts.  In BEA Table 3.3, the variable G is Line 22 plus 
Line 35. The variable E is Line 33 less G. L is Line 39. A is the ARRA component of Line 20 plus Line 28 of the 
BEA publication “Effect of the ARRA on Selected Federal Government Sector Transactions.”  The 
variable R is line 33 of Table 3.3 less A.  Note that total expenditures (Line 33 of Table 3.3) include net purchases 
of “non-produced assets” and exclude consumption of fixed capital.  These series are also consistent with the state 
and local sector of the Federal Reserve’s flow of funds accounts.  As explained the appendix, net lending or net 
borrowing equals net financial investment minus the statistical discrepancy due to the difference between data on 
acquisition of financial assets/ liabilities and income/expenditure data.    9 
 
 
Then the budget constraint facing state and local governments is 
  
Gt  +  Et  +  Lt  =  Rt  +  At      ( 1 )  
 
The key question is how much an increase in ARRA grants At results in an increase in 
state and local government purchases Gt .  Note that, depending on various constraints and 
expectations, an increase in At could also affect other expenditures Et or loans/borrowings Lt.   
 
The Lack of a Response in Government Purchases to ARRA 
Figure 6 shows the pattern of state and local government purchases from 2008 to the 
second quarter of 2010.  One critical fact stands out in this figure: state and local government 
purchases declined sharply in the fourth quarter of 2008 and have remained remarkably flat since 
then.  There is no noticeable increase in government purchases since the beginning of the ARRA 
grants. As of the second quarter of 2010, they are still below the level reached in the fourth 
quarter of 2008.   
The timing and magnitude of these income and spending changes are put in a more 
precise quantitative perspective in Table 3. The table’s first row shows the change in state and 
local government receipts, excluding the receipt of ARRA grants, from the 2
nd quarter 2008 
level.  We have chosen to use this quarter as the starting point for the analysis rather than the 
official starting date of 2007Q4 because 2008Q2 is the point in time in which receipts reached 
their peak.  The recession appears to have had a delayed effect on state and local finances.  From 
the official recession’s beginning to the 2
nd quarter of 2008, state and local revenues grew at an 10 
 
annual rate of 5.2 percent; faster than its 4.9 percent growth in the year leading up to the 
recession’s onset.   As the data in row 1 show, state and local receipts, after reaching their peak, 
declined sharply through the first half of 2009; they began to rebound during the latter half of 
2009, and climbed back to their 2008 peak level by the beginning of 2010.   
 
 
Table 3.  Change in Receipts and Purchases of Goods and Services from 2008Q2 Level 
(Billions of dollars at annual rates) 
 
  2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2010Q1 2010Q2 
 
Receipts  ex  ARRA  -3.8  -34.9 -74.3 -71.8 -44.3 -19.8 -1.7  -1.8 
 
Purchases  24.6  -13.4 -35.9 -25.1 -26.2 -30  -27  -20.5 
 
ARRA grants ex    
Medicaid 









The change in state and local government purchases from their level in the 2
nd quarter of 
2008 is presented in row 2.  Government purchases show a sharp reduction beginning in late 
2008 and early 2009 and no appreciable rebound thereafter. The lack of rebound in purchases 
occurs despite the receipt of ARRA grants.  The ARRA grants are shown in row 3 and exclude 
Medicaid grants, reflecting the assumption that Medicaid grants are not fungible. The non-
Medicaid ARRA grants begin as a trickle in the first quarter of 2009 and flow into state and local 
governments in increasingly larger amounts as time progresses.  By the first two quarters of 11 
 
2010, the non-Medicaid ARRA grants reach $60-90 billion on an annualized basis.  But, as Table 
3 makes very clear, state and local government purchases show no response.
4   
 
Where Did the Money Go? 
The data presented in Table 3 raise the question: if the ARRA grants to states were not 
spent by state and local governments on increased purchases of goods and services, how were 
these grants spent?  Assuming that tax codes are not changed in response to ARRA, the budget 
constraint (equation 1) allows for only two other possibilities: higher expenditures on “non-
purchase” activities and lower borrowing.  Figures 7 and 8 provide some indication of each of 
these alternatives.    
Figure 7 shows that state and local government “non-purchase” expenditures have kept 
growing without any slowdown. The pace of their growth appears to have picked up since the 
ARRA grants began.  
The data in Table 4 confirm these graphical observations.  Row 1 shows the change in 
non-purchase expenditures from its level in the second quarter of 2008 (when state and local 
revenues peaked) to each subsequent quarter.  Non-purchase expenditures rise at an almost 
unbroken rate and, by the second quarter of 2010, they are 17 percent higher than they were two 
years earlier.  This increase stands in sharp contrast to the decline in state and local purchases.  
As the table also shows, non-purchase expenditures begin their sharp rise at precisely the same 
time as state and local governments receive their first installment of ARRA grants (shown in row 
2).   
 
                                                            
4 Including Medicaid grants in receipts reinforces this point.  Under the alternative assumption that Medicaid grants 
are fungible and, hence would be included in state and local receipts available to finance purchases, the total ARRA 




Table 4 Change in Receipts and Non-Purchase Expenditures from 2008Q2 Level 
(Billions of dollars at annual rates) 
 
  2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2010Q1 2010Q2 
            
Non-
Purchases 
0.9  0.6  14.4 19.9 35.2 32.7 42.8 67.2 
 
 
ARRA  grants  0  0  49.4 73.4 90.3 102.8  106.1  126.3 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the pattern of state and local net lending or net borrowing, the remaining 
area that could be impacted by ARRA grants. As the chart shows, although state and local 
governments have on average been borrowing in recent years, there have been large swings.  
Borrowing increased sharply after the dot com bubble burst in 2000 and did not start falling 
again until 2003 long after the recovery from the 2001 recession began.  Borrowing increased 
again as the housing bubble burst, but then started turning around before the recession was over, 
much earlier than in the previous recession. 
The data in Tables 3 and 4 are combined in Table 5 to show the behavior of total state 
and local net borrowing and its relation to ARRA receipts during the current recession.  Row 1 
shows total state and local expenditures.  Row 2, 3, and 4 display state and local receipts 











Table 5.  Change in Receipts and Net Lending from 2008Q2 Level 
(Billions of dollars at annual rates) 
 
  
  2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2010Q1 2010Q2 
 
Total Expenditures  
 
Receipts 
26  -13 -22 -5  9  3  16  47 
 
 
Receipts  ex  ARRA  -4  -35 -74 -72 -44 -20 -2  -2 
ARRA  Grants 0  0  49 73 90 103  106  126 
Total Receipts  -4 -35 -25 2  46 83 104 125 
 
Net  Lending  -29  -22  -4 -7 37 80 89 78 
 
 
In sum, an inspection of these data suggests that the ARRA grants to state and local 
governments were not associated with an increase in government purchases, but rather with an 
increase on other forms of government expenditures and reduced borrowing.    
 
A Counterfactual  
What would have happened to government purchases in the counterfactual event that 
there had not been an ARRA? It is certainly possible that state and local purchases of goods and 
services would have declined further than they have during the current recession.  But a much 
more likely hypothesis is that that the states would have held government purchases at the levels 
actually observed during the recession and would have instead not increased net lending as they 
did during this period. We examine this hypothesis in two ways: one using contemporaneous 
data and the other using historical data. 
The contemporaneous data amounts to a reasonableness test. The test can be described 
with the help of Table 6.  The first column of Table 6 shows actual ARRA grants and the actual 
cumulative changes in purchases, non-purchase expenditures, and borrowing from their pre-14 
 
ARRA levels (4
th quarter of 2008). From the 1
st quarter of 2009 to the second quarter of 2010, 
state and local governments received a total of $137 billion in ARRA grants.  During this period, 
these governments reduced their rate of borrowing compared to pre-ARRA levels by $105 
billion.  In the counterfactual absence of ARRA, a likely outcome is that state and local 
governments would have instead held their borrowing rate at its pre-ARRA level.  We show this 
in the column labeled “counterfactual” in Table 6. Had they done so, they would still have been 
able to finance a $20 billion increase in non-purchase expenditures over the period without 
relying on ARRA grants.  This counterfactual increase, also shown in Table 6, is about 40 
percent of the actual increase and a 3.6 percent increase from the pre-ARRA level.
5  The 
hypothesis that states, in the absence of ARRA, would have relied on a continuation of prior 
borrowing rates to maintain the lion’s share of their purchases of goods and services and finance 
a slight increase non-purchases (mainly health and welfare programs) strikes us as quite 
reasonable. 
 
Table 6. Total Changes in Budget Amounts from Pre-ARRA Levels: 2009Q1 to 2010Q2 
(Cumulative Change from 2008Q4, Billions of Dollars) 
 
  
 Actual Counterfactual 
ARRA Grants   137     0 
Purchases  -  21  -21 
Non-purchase expenditures     52   20 
Net Borrowing  -105     0 
 
 
The historical test of the hypothesis that state and local government purchases would 
have been the same without ARRA compares the behavior of state and local purchases in the 
current recession to its behavior in previous recessions.  Table 7 shows changes in state and local 
                                                            
5 The base used for this percentage calculation is the 2008Q4 rate of non-purchases spending continued for six 
quarters. 15 
 
purchases as a percent of total state and local receipts for each post World War II recession.  For 
the current recession, the change is measured from the start of the recession to the most recent 
quarter 2010Q2.  This latter quarter is one year after the recession officially ended.  For each 
prior recession, the change is measured from the recession’s official start date to one year after 
its official end date.       
The change in purchases relative to receipts is highly variable from one recessionary 
period to the next; ranging from an increase of 8.8 percentage points in the 1953-54 recessionary 
period to a decrease of 3.5 percentage points in the 2001 recessionary period.  In seven out of the 
ten prior post-World War II recessions, purchases decline relative to revenues.  The average of 
the ten prior periods is .28 percentage points.  The current recessionary period is the largest 
decline by a considerable margin and represents a post-WWII record.  This decline, in our view 
reflects the failure of ARRA grants to boost state and local purchases. Had there been no ARRA 
grants, total receipts in 2010Q2 would have been $127 billion less (at an annual rate), and even if 
state and local government purchases had not declined from their historical level, as a percent of 
revenues these purchases would have declined by .9 percent, less than historical average change.  
 




1948-49   3.6 













Why are State and Local Purchases Unresponsive to ARRA Grants? 
The stark difference in the behavior of state and local purchases and non-purchases 
expenditures provides a possible explanation for the small effect of ARRA on purchases. While 
additional research is needed to form a strong conclusion, one likely explanation lies in the 
design of the federal stimulus plan.  The lion’s share of non-purchase expenditures consists of 
state and local spending on health and welfare programs; in particular, Medicaid, TANF, and 
general assistance programs.
6 A large share of the ARRA grants was designed to supplement 
these programs, especially states’ Medicaid programs. In the first quarter of 2009, virtually all 
(92 percent) of ARRA grants are accounted for by Medicaid.  In the 2
nd quarter of 2010, 
Medicaid grants still account for over 30 percent of the ARRA total.  The ARRA conditioned 
states’ receipt of federal Medicaid grants on their willingness to not reduce benefits nor restrict 
eligibility rules. In some states, this also meant undoing benefit reductions or eligibility 
restrictions that had been implemented in the six months prior to the ARRA’s enactment.  It is 
possible that this “hold-harmless” provision, in the face of rising health care costs and recession-
induced Medicaid enrollment increases, forced states to reallocate funds that would have 





6 Under Section 5001 of the ARRA (P.L.111-5), to be eligible for additional Medicaid grants state 
Medicaid programs must maintain eligibility standards and benefits that are not more restrictive than 
those in effect on July 1, 2008. More restrictive eligibility would preclude a state from receiving the 
increased Medicaid funds until it had restored eligibility standards, methodologies or procedures to those 
in effect on July 1, 2008. (https://www.cms.gov/Recovery/Downloads/ARRA_FAQs.pdf) 
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Time Series Regression Estimates of the Impact of ARRA 
Simple time series regression techniques can also be used to estimate the impact of 
ARRA grants at the state and local level.  Using the notation previously introduced, we consider 
the following three equations: 
 
Gt = a0 + a1G t-1 + a2Rt + a3At        (2) 
Et = b0 + b1E t-1 + b2Rt + b3At        (3) 
Lt = c0 + c1G t-1 + c2E t-1 + c3Rt + c4At      (4)   
 
Equation (2) describes how government purchases responds to ARRA grants and to receipts 
other than ARRA grants.   The lagged dependent variable allows for the possibility that 
purchases respond with a lag to changes in income, much as an estimated consumption function 
for households includes lagged consumption to portray such lags.  Equation (3) for non-
purchases expenditures is of the same functional form.  
The state and local budget constraint (1) along with equations (2) and (3) imply equation 
(4) for net lending.   The relationship between the coefficients in equation (4) and the 
coefficients in equations (2) and (3) can be obtained by substituting equations (2) and (3) into 
equation (1). This gives  
   
   Lt = Rt + At - a0 - a1G t-1 - a2Rt - a3At   - b0 - b1E t-1 - b2Rt - b3At 
                 =   - (a0 + b0) - a1G t-1 - b1E t-1 + (1- a2 - b2) Rt  + (1 - a3 - b3)At  (5) 
 
which implies the following identities: 18 
 
 
c0 = - (a0 + b0)         ( 6 )  
c1 = - a1         (7) 
c2 = - b1         (8)   
c3 = (1- a2 - b2)         ( 9 )  
c4 = (1 - a3 - b3)        ( 1 0 )  
 
   We estimated equations (2), (3), and (4) by ordinary least squares over the period from 
1969.1 to 2010.2.   An inspection of the residuals of the estimated equations showed some serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity which differed from equation to equation, so we computed the 
standard errors of the estimated coefficients in each equation with a heteroskedasticity auto-
correlation consistent (HAC) method due to Newey and West (1987). The estimated coefficients 
along with t-statistics using these standard errors are reported in Table 8 along with the estimated 
first-order auto-regressive coefficient (ρ) of the estimated residuals.   
Observe that the coefficient on ARRA grants in the government purchases equation is 
negative and statistically different from zero, while the coefficient on ARRA grants in the non-
purchase expenditures equation is positive and statistically different from zero.  Taken together, 
the two coefficients imply that ARRA had a negligible impact on total state and local 
expenditures.  Indeed, there is a very large and significant effect of ARRA grants on net lending. 
The coefficient on ARRA grants is nearly one.  Thus, these regression results are consistent with 
the findings from the graphical and numerical analysis presented above that states and localities 
used ARRA grants primarily to reduce their borrowing.  19 
 
Note that all of the estimated coefficients in the net lending equation are very close to 
those implied by the estimated coefficients in the government purchases and non-purchase 
expenditures equations using the above identities.  In particular, the sum of the impact of the 




Table 8.  Estimated regression coefficients for the equations for government purchases (G), 
non-purchase expenditures (E), and net lending (L) as a function of total receipts less 
ARRA grants (R) and ARRA grants (A). Sample 1969.1 - 2010.2. In the parentheses are t-
statistics computed from Newey-West (1987) estimated standard errors 
  
 
Dependent  Variable 
 
 G  E  L 
    
Constant 3.646  -2.51  2.113 
 (3.5)  (-2.2)  (1.0) 
    
G(-1) 0.862 ------  -0.860 
 (15.4)   (-12.20) 
    
E(-1) ------ 0.873 -0.750 
  (19.7)  (-10.71) 
    
R  0.125 0.028 0.819 
 (2.7)  (3.15)  (13.4) 
    
A -0.110  0.098  0.985 
 (-2.2)  (3.23)  (13.2) 
    
R²  0.99 0.99 0.95 





     
 
The framework described in equations (2)-(4) can be augmented to test the 
aforementioned hypothesis that state and local purchases failed to respond positively to ARRA 20 
 
because the conditions attached to ARRA Medicaid grants diverted revenues that would have 
otherwise been used to finance purchases of goods and serves.  The regressions presented in 
Table 9 provide such a test.  The specification is identical to the specification presented in Table 
8, except that ARRA grants are split into two components: Medicaid grants (M) and all other 
ARRA grants (N).  Note that the same coefficient identities shown in equation (10) for A are 
implied for the coefficients on M and N in the augmented equations.    
 
Table 9.  Estimated regression coefficients for the equations for government purchases (G), 
non-purchases expenditures (E), and net lending (L), splitting the effects of ARRA grants 
into Medicaid grants (M) and non-Medicaid grants (N).  Sample 1969.1 - 2010.2. In the 
parentheses are t-statistics computed from Newey-West (1987) estimated standard errors. 
 
 
 Dependent  Variables 
 G  E  L 
Constant 3.396  -2.507  2.564 
 (3.3)  (-2.1)  (1.2) 
    
G(-1) 0.882 ------- -0.882 
 (16.2)   (-11.8) 
    
E(-1) ------ 0.873 -0.743 
  (19.6)  (-11.1) 
    
R  0.108 0.028 0.835 
  (2.4) (3.1) (13.1) 
    
M -0.469  0.105  1.353 
 (-2.7)  (1.1)  (5.0) 
    
N  0.106 0.094 0.761 
  (2.5) (1.1) (8.7) 
    
R²  0.99 0.99 0.95 
    





The government purchases regression gives a reasonably clear picture of the impact of 
ARRA.  Consistent with our hypothesis, there is a large negative and statistically significant 
effect of Medicaid grants on state and local purchases.  Holding non-ARRA state revenues 
constant, each additional dollar of ARRA Medicaid grants reduces government purchases by 
about 50 cents.  Non-Medicaid ARRA grants, on the other hand, have a much smaller positive 
effect; the sum of the coefficients on the ARRA Medicaid variable and the ARRA non-Medicaid 
variable equals -.36 and is significantly different from 0 with a standard error of .15.  This result 
suggests that the negative impact of total ARRA grants found in Table 8 is not just the 
coincidence that states and localities happened to be  reducing their purchases of goods and 
services for reasons unrelated to ARRA just as the ARRA grants were beginning to flow-in.  
Looking over at the net lending equation in Table 9, however, we see evidence that the 
estimated coefficient on Medicaid grants in the purchases equation probably implies too large of 
a negative impact on purchases. In the net lending equation the coefficient on ARRA Medicaid 
grants exceeds one, which is implausibly high, implying that each dollar of ARRA Medicaid 
grants reduced state and local borrowing by more than one dollar.  In addition the Medicaid grant 
coefficient in the net lending equation is nearly twice the size of the non-Medicaid ARRA 
coefficient; because Medicaid grants are less fungible than other grants, we would have expected 
the opposite relationship.  A smaller positive impact of M in the lending equation would suggest 
a smaller negative impact of M in the purchases equation.    Finally we note that in the  non-
purchases regression in Table 9  the coefficients on the ARRA Medicaid grants and  the non-
Medicaid ARRA grants are jointly statistically significant (based on an F-test), which is 
consistent with the finding in Table 8, though they are not significant individually as indicated by 
the t-tests.  22 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
  In this paper we have examined the effect of the American Economic Recovery Act of 
1999 on government purchases of goods and services using new data provided by the Commerce 
Department.  Considering both the federal and the state and local sector, we find that the effects 
of ARRA on purchases to have been remarkably small for the first six quarters of the program 
despite the large overall size of ARRA.  It appears that the ARRA grants were allocated to 
transfer payments, such as Medicaid, and to increasing net lending by state and local 
governments rather than to government purchases.  Basic economic theory implies that 
temporary increases in transfer payments have a much smaller impact than government 
purchases. The counterfactual hypothesis that spending would have been even worse without 
ARRA does not seem plausible based on contemporaneous data or historical experience.  
  While a more definitive examination will be possible after all the data are in, these 
empirical findings already have important implications.   
First, they suggest that the debate over the size of the government purchases multiplier is 
overshadowed in the case of ARRA by the small magnitude of what the multiplier actually 
multiplies. To illustrate this we show in Figure 9 the estimates for government purchases under 
ARRA which we used in Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2009) along with the estimates for 
the first six quarters of ARRA derived here, assuming that there has been no increase in 
purchases at the state and local level. Following the rule of thumb used in the government, in the 
earlier paper we assumed that 60 percent of the grants would results in an increase in government 
purchases.  While our original estimates of the impact of ARRA purchases reported in Cogan, 23 
 
Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2009) were much smaller than Romer and Bernstein (2009), the 
actual impact has been even smaller than we estimated.   
Second, the findings help explain the apparent puzzle that the very large $862 billion 
ARRA stimulus package resulted in such a small contribution of changes in government 
purchases to changes in real GDP since the ARRA program began.  Figure 10 shows the small 
contribution of changes in government purchases at the Federal and state and local level to the 
growth rate of real GDP during the recession and the recovery. The explanation of course is that 
government purchases changed very little in contrast to much larger changes in government 
expenditures.      
Third, the findings raise questions about the feasibility of such countercyclical stimulus 
programs.  In the federal system, the states and localities make decisions about their own 
government purchases and the federal government has only limited ability to affect these 
decisions in particular ways, especially over a short period of time when money is fungible and 
the timing of projects can be postponed or grants can substitute for capital borrowing.  The 
implication is not that the stimulus program was too small, but rather that such programs are 
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Appendix: Flow of Funds in the State and Local Sector 
An examination of the Federal Reserve’s flow of funds data for the state and local sector 
sheds additional light on the responses of the states and localities to the ARRA grants.  The 
figure below shows “net financial investment,” the difference between the net acquisition of 
financial assets and the net increase in liabilities.  Financial liabilities consist mostly of 
municipal securities (largely long-term), though there is a small amount of trade payables.  
Observe that net financial investment fell from the beginning of the recession, but then started 
increasing, especially in 2009.  Net financial investment rose by $106 billion (from -$151 billion 
to -$45 billion) from 2008.4 to 2010.2.  
The figure also shows “net lending or net borrowing” data from BEA for the same period 
(see Figure 8 for earlier years). The two series are identical in theory, but because “net financial 
investment” is measured from changes in financial assets and liabilities and “net lending or net 
borrowing” is measured from income and spending data, the two series are not identical in 
practice.  The difference between them is the sector discrepancy.  During this period the sector 




















How did the increase in net financial investment break down into changes in financial 
assets compared to changes in financial liabilities?  As shown in the next Figure the net 
acquisition of financial assets rose much more rapidly in 2009 than did the increase in financial 
liabilities. The net acquisition of financial assets rose by $97 billion from 2008.4 to 2010.2 (from 
-$135 billion to $-38 billion) while the net increase in liabilities fell by $7 billion over the same 
period (from $15 billion to $8 billion).  In other words, the increase in net financial investment as 
the ARRA grants were received was largely due to a larger rise in the acquisition of financial 
assets than in the increase in liabilities.   
This is additional evidence in favor of the hypothesis that it would have been quite 
feasible and plausible for states and localities to reduce their net lending if there had not been an 
ARRA.  If there had been no ARRA the states might not have increased their acquisition of 
financial assets during this period (While there is a sharp decrease in both series in the 2010.2, 31 
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